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Little is known about how older persons determine if someone deserves their trust or not
based on their facial appearance, a process referred to as “facial trustworthiness.” In the
past few years, Todorov and colleagues have argued that, in young adults, trustworthiness
judgments are an extension of emotional judgments, and therefore, that trust judgments
are made based on a continuum between anger and happiness (Todorov, 2008; Engell
et al., 2010). Evidence from the literature on emotion processing suggest that older
adults tend to be less efficient than younger adults in the recognition of negative facial
expressions (Calder et al., 2003; Firestone et al., 2007; Ruffman et al., 2008; Chaby
and Narme, 2009). Based on Todorov’s theory and the fact that older adults seem to be
less efficient than younger adults in identifying emotional expressions, one could expect
that older individuals would have different representations of trustworthy faces and that
they would use different cues than younger adults in order to make such judgments.
We verified this hypothesis using a variation of Mangini and Biederman’s (2004) reverse
correlation method in order to test and compare classification images resulting from
trustworthiness (in the context of money investment), from happiness, and from anger
judgments in two groups of participants: young adults and older healthy adults. Our results
show that for elderly participants, both happy and angry representations are correlated
with trustworthiness judgments. However, in young adults, trustworthiness judgments
are mainly correlated with happiness representations. These results suggest that young
and older adults differ in their way of judging trustworthiness.
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INTRODUCTION
Recognizing someone’s intentions based on available facial infor-
mation is a task performed on a daily basis. When meeting a
new person, one of the most important social judgments is trust,
which can subsequently determine the course of social interac-
tions and prevent potentially risky encounters. Surprisingly, little
is known about the evolution of facial trustworthiness process-
ing during the course of aging. To our knowledge, only one study
has directly addressed that question and has found age differences
in bold activity related to trust judgments (Castle et al., 2012).
It seems particularly worthwhile to pay attention to trustwor-
thiness judgments in elderly populations as studies have shown
that older adults are more vulnerable to fraud than their younger
counterparts (Templeton and Kirkman, 2007; Alves and Wilson,
2008) and changes in trustworthiness judgments may be one
of the contributing factors to this increased susceptibility. For
instance, Tehan and Blanchard-Fields (2008) tested a group of
young adults and a group of elderly on their ability to detect
deceit using interviews (crime and opinion topics) presented in
three conditions: audio only, visual only and audio-visual. Their
results show that older adults are, overall, less efficient than
younger adults in detecting deceit. Moreover, in the visual and
audio-visual crime interviews, they show less benefit of the visual
information than younger adults. The authors suggest that their
results could be explained by a difference between younger adults
and older adults in their ability to recognize facial expressions
of emotions, particularly negative facial expressions of emotions
such as fear and shame. This hypothesis finds support in the
emotion recognition literature regarding normal aging. Indeed,
many studies (although not all, see Mienaltowski et al., 2013)
have shown that older individuals are less efficient in recognizing
emotional expressions (Calder et al., 2003; Sullivan and Ruffman,
2004a,b; Firestone et al., 2007; Sullivan et al., 2007; Chaby and
Narme, 2009). This reduced efficiency seems to affect mainly
visual representations of emotions, more specifically the ability
to recognize facial expressions of emotions (Phillips et al., 2002;
Keightley et al., 2006). Recently, a meta-analysis covering 17 stud-
ies on facial expression recognition in aging has shown that anger,
sadness and fear are less accurately recognized in elderly adults
than in younger adults, although disgust seems to be equally or
even better recognized in elderly participants when compared to
younger adults (Ruffman et al., 2008).
Despite the poor amount of literature concerning trustworthi-
ness judgments in elderly, quite a few studies have been published
in the past few years in regards to this type of judgment in
young adults, showing a growing interest in understanding the
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underlying processes of social judgments in this population. Even
though faces are complex stimuli, it seems that social judgments
based on faces can be achieved very easily. For instance, Willis
and Todorov (2006) have shown that judgments of trust based
on faces can be made quickly. In fact, exposing a face for 100ms
is sufficient for one to formulate a first impression on that face,
and this first impression seems to be long-lasting. Nevertheless,
a question persists regarding how we process such complex judg-
ments in such a short time. Todorov et al. (2008) have suggested
that the use of specific regions of the face contributes to making
the decision of trusting someone or not. They reported that the
judgment of trustworthiness mainly relies on four different facial
features: the inner eyebrows, cheekbones, chins and nose sellion.
A reverse correlation study by Dotsch and Todorov (2012) later
established a relationship between trustworthy representations
and untrustworthy representations in faces. Indeed, they showed
that the representation of a trustworthy face corresponds to the
opposite representation of an untrustworthy face, suggesting a
continuum between trustworthiness and untrustworthiness rep-
resentations. Moreover, the use of reverse correlation has allowed
to identify the facial features used in determining whether a face is
trustworthy or not, and to demonstrate that the eyes, mouth, eye-
brows and hair regions are of particular importance in this type
of decision.
To better understand trustworthiness judgments, Oosterhof
and Todorov (2008) have developed a 2Dmodel of face evaluation
based on behavioral studies and computer modeling. This model
suggests that in order to decide whether a face looks trustworthy
or not, one would first judge that face on two dimensions: valence
and dominance. In this model, valence evaluation is defined as an
overgeneralization of perception of facial cues signaling whether
to approach or avoid a person, whereas dominance evaluation is
defined as an overgeneralization of perception of facial cues sig-
naling the physical strength/weakness of the person. Oosterhof
and Todorov (2008) have demonstrated that, in judging faces on
14 different traits, the trustworthiness judgment correlated highly
with the valence of a face (0.94), and therefore was sufficient to
summarize the evaluative information present in all other trait
judgments. In other words, they argued that in situations where
no other context is provided, judging a face on trustworthiness is
a reflection of inferences about the positivity/negativity of a face.
Following these findings, Todorov’s group formulated the
hypothesis that trustworthiness judgments might be an exten-
sion of emotional judgments in a context where we need to
decide whether to approach or to avoid a person showing a
neutral face, without any emotional cue. They first addressed
this question using their model of face evaluation, where they
took the faces judged as the most trustworthy/untrustworthy
and exaggerated the features of the face found to influence the
judgment of trustworthiness. They then asked participants to
classify these “extreme” trustworthy/untrustworthy faces into cat-
egories corresponding to the six basic emotions. When relating
the trustworthiness level of these faces with the category in which
the faces were classified, the only responses above chance were
the ones where faces were categorized as angry, neutral and
happy. Based on this information, Todorov (2008) has argued
that, in young adults, trustworthiness judgments are an extension
of emotional judgments, and therefore that the judgment of
trustworthiness is based on a continuum between anger and
happiness. Todorov’s group further strengthened this theory by
testing their hypothesis in behavioral studies using three differ-
ent paradigms. In the first study, Oosterhof and Todorov (2009)
used a dynamic stimulus paradigm in which participants saw a
dynamic transformation between a neutral face and a happy or
angry face and were asked to judge the intensity of the final face’s
expression. Using the same stimuli, the authors manipulated the
degree of trustworthiness of the faces presented. Their results
suggested that changes on the trustworthiness continuum cor-
responded to slight changes resembling emotional expressions.
In another study, Said et al. (2009) used a Bayesian network
classifier, trained to detect emotional expressions, to show that
neutral faces were classified based on trait inferences and that pos-
itive valence resembles happiness expressions, whereas negative
valence resembles fear or disgust expressions. Finally, Engell et al.
(2010) used a behavioral adaptation paradigm and found that
adapting to angry or happy facial expressions causes trustworthi-
ness evaluations of subsequently rated neutral faces to increase
or decrease, respectively. These three studies thus support the
existence of a relationship between trustworthiness judgments
and emotional judgments, and, more specifically, a link between
happiness, anger and trustworthiness judgments. Furthermore,
this theory finds support in the emotion recognition literature,
which provides evidence that the structures used to identify basic
emotions might also be involved in the process of social judg-
ments. For instance, studies of patients presenting lesions to the
amygdala have revealed that these patients are not only impaired
in the recognition of negative emotions, but also tend to judge
faces as more trustworthy than controls (Adolphs et al., 1994,
1998).
In sum, evidence from behavioral studies on trustworthiness
judgments in young adults and patient studies seem to relate
social judgments to emotional judgments. Considering that older
adults seem to be less efficient than younger adults in identify-
ing emotional expressions, one could expect that older persons
would have different mental representations of trustworthy faces.
Older adults might also use different cues than younger adults
in order to make trust judgments. We sought to explore this
hypothesis in two groups of participants: young and older adults.
Contrary to previous studies on facial trustworthiness, such as
those of Todorov and colleagues, we asked participants to judge
trustworthiness in a specific context (i.e., money investment) in
order to eliminate context as a potential source of variability—
especially across age groups—from our results. We employed a
classification image method, capable of revealing properties of
mental representations of trustworthiness, happiness, and anger.
In the past 10 years or so, such methods have been used to better
understand the internal representations underlying face recogni-
tion (e.g., Gosselin and Schyns, 2001, 2003; Schyns et al., 2002;
Mangini and Biederman, 2004; Sekuler et al., 2004; Adolphs et al.,
2005; Smith et al., 2005; Blais et al., 2012). More recently, as
illustrated by this special issue, classification images have even
been used to examine mental representations of the social brain:
the internal representation of facial emotion recognition across
cultures (Dotsch et al., 2008; Jack et al., 2011, 2012) and the
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identification of trustworthy and of untrustworthy faces (Dotsch
and Todorov, 2012).
METHODS
In this study, trustworthiness judgments were investigated by
applying a variation of Mangini and Biederman’s (2004) reverse
correlation technique. Thismethod consists of asking participants
to do a discrimination task on faces to which noise is added. In
Mangini and Biederman’s experiments, noise patterns were cre-
ated based on 6 different orientations and 2 different phases and
participants were asked to categorize one face regarding gender,
expression and identity. Our method was different in three ways.
First, instead of presenting only one stimulus and asking par-
ticipants to categorize this unique stimulus, we presented two
stimuli and asked participants to choose between the two stim-
uli. This way, the participants’ choices rely only on the different
influence of noise on the same faces (see also Dupuis-Roy and
Gosselin, 2007; Dotsch and Todorov, 2012). Second, the patterns
of noise consisted of Gaussian white noise. Third and, finally, the
underlying faces were different on each trial and were not chosen
to be neutral on the combination of trustworthiness, happiness
and anger, which would have been difficult, if not impossible,
to achieve. Instead, different faces of women expressing a neu-
tral emotion were presented on each trial. This bank of faces was
chosen because it contains faces of young and older adults. We
limited ourselves to women to eliminate the variability in judg-
ments (anger, and, possibly, trust) attributable to interactions
with gender.
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-seven young adults (13 men) between 19 and 29 years
old (median = 21 years, inter-quartile range = 4, mean = 22
years, standard deviation = 2.7) and 25 older adults (12 men)
between 56 and 74 years old (median = 64 years, inter-quartile
range = 8.5, mean = 65 years, standard deviation = 5.6) took
part in this experiment. Young participants were recruited on
campus whereas elderly participants were recruited via a bank
of normal elderly participants from the Centre de recherche de
l’Institut universitaire de gériatrie de Montréal (CRIUGM). For
the group of older adults, all participants were assessed with a
battery of neuropsychological tasks, in order to exclude the pres-
ence of major cognitive deficits. Performance on these tests is
summarized in Table 1. A vast majority of participants from the
two groups were Caucasian and the others had been living in
Montreal since a very early age. All participants had normal or
corrected to normal vision. This was verified using standard ques-
tions to ensure that the older participants did not suffer from
common visual conditions (such as cataract, glaucoma, macular
degeneration, etc.).
STIMULI
On each trial in a block, one of 150 grayscale face pictures
(256 × 256 pixels) was picked (without replacement). All these
images depicted a front-view and eyes-open Caucasian woman
face aged between 20 and 70 years old. The face depicted a neutral
expression. The faces were aligned on 12 handpicked, easily-
identifiable facial landmarks (four landmarks on each eye and
Table 1 | Neuropsychological results of elderly participants.
Test N Mean SD
MoCA 24 26.96 1.92
MMSE 19 29.12 0.78
Digit span
Forward 24 6.5 5.4
Backward 24 1.3 1.0
Benton faces 25 45.96 4.08
Benton lines 25 24.77 3.27
VOSP 25 19.69 0.47
Trails A (time) 25 36.68 14.96
Trails B (time) 25 69.64 22.41
BNT—short form 25 14.04 1.86
Buschke—1st recall 22 9.6 2.41
Buschke—2nd recall 22 11.65 2.71
Buschke—3rd recall 22 12.55 2.48
Buschke—delayed recall 22 13.55 2.37
RCFT—copy 25 33.88 1.47
RCFT—immediate recall 25 15.13 5.54
RCFT—delayed recall 24 16.71 3.72
four on the mouth) using linear conformal transformation. Two
Gaussian noise fields of 128 × 128 pixels rescaled at 256 × 256
pixels (with the nearest-neighbor algorithm) were added to that
face to produce two face stimuli. Thus, for each trial, two images
(image width = 6.8◦ of visual angle; face width = about 3.8◦ of
visual angle), only differing by the pattern of noise added to the
original image, were presented side-by-side on the screen (3.6◦ of
visual angle apart) for 3 s (see Figure 2 for an example of stim-
ulus). All stimuli were presented on CRT monitors (1024× 768
pixels), calibrated using a Samsung SyncMaster753df photometer
to allow linear manipulation of luminance. The resulting cor-
rected table contained 137 luminance levels, ranging from 0.31 to
107 cd/m2. On average, the RMS of the base images was equal to
0.2176 (SD = 0.0181) and that of the noise fields to 0.1999 (SD =
0.0011). The background luminance was equal to 53.65 cd/m2.
The refresh rate was 60Hz. Distance to the screen was maintained
at 50 cm (using a chinrest) during the whole experiment.
PROCEDURES
The experimental programs were run on a PC computer in the
Matlab (Mathworks™) environment and used functions from the
Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Participants
completed two blocks of 150 trials for each of the three conditions
(trustworthiness, happiness, and anger). The order of presen-
tation of the conditions was counter-balanced across subjects.
At the beginning of each block, the question to which the par-
ticipant had to answer for that specific block appeared on the
screen (e.g., “Which face looks angrier?”). For the trustworthi-
ness condition, the notion of trust was put in a context of money
investment (i.e., “If you had a big amount of money to invest, who
would you trust the most with your money?”). We feared that the
default trustworthiness contexts would be much more dissimilar
between age groups than within them. As we were not interested
in these default trustworthiness contexts per se—we were rather
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interested in comparing implicit representations of faces express-
ing trustworthiness in comparable contexts—we provided this
money investment context, which is usual for both age groups.
In contrast, Todorov and colleagues did not contextualize facial
trustworthiness in their studies. Participants saw the stimuli for
3 s, after which they had to choose, by pressing right or left keys on
the keyboard, which one of the two stimuli presented seemed the
most trustworthy/happy/angry (see Figure 1). Participants were
told that the task was difficult, to do their best to answer cor-
rectly, based on their first general impression, without taking too
much time.
RESULTS
For each condition and for each individual, we subtracted the sum
of the standardized Gaussian noise fields of 128 × 128 pixels of
all rejected stimuli from the sum of the standardized Gaussian
noise fields of 128× 128 pixels of all chosen stimuli (e.g., Dupuis-
Roy and Gosselin, 2007), thus obtaining a total of three individual
classification images (CI) of 128 × 128 pixels. Then, we smoothed
the CIs using a Gaussian filter (SD = 3 pixels), and transformed
these smooth CIs into Z-score planes by dividing them by the
square root of the number of standardized Gaussian noise fields
that went into their construction. Not a single pixel of these
individual CIs actually attained statistical significance (Pixel test,
FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in the experiment. The question
appeared on the first frame of a block. Then, a green dot served as a
fixation point and appeared on the screen for 200ms. The stimuli then
appeared for three seconds after which a choice was required. This
sequence of events was repetead for the 150 trials of the block.
two-tailed, search region = 4275 pixels, p > 0.05; for details, see
Chauvin et al., 2005).
To increase signal-to-noise ratio, we decided to combine
all individual CIs per age group and per judgment. However,
such group CIs are meaningful only if there is good agreement
between the combined individual CIs. Therefore, to evaluate this
agreement, we calculated the Pearson correlations between every
individual CI’s and the corresponding group CI’s, restricting
the computation to the union of areas that attained statisti-
cal significance in all group CI’s (all judgments and age groups
confounded)—a total of 297 pixels. Mean correlations were 0.33
(quartiles: 0.24, 0.35, and 0.43; 30/31 correlations were positive),
0.22 (quartiles: 0.11, 0.26, and 0.37; 28/31 correlations were pos-
itive), and 0.18 (quartiles: 0.13, 0.20, and 0.26; 26/31 correlations
were positive), respectively, for the happiness, anger, and trust-
worthiness CI’s in younger adults; and mean correlations were
0.63 (quartiles: 0.54, 0.65, and 0.78; all correlations were posi-
tive), 0.53 (quartiles: 0.36, 0.55, and 0.73; all correlations were
positive), and 0.46 (quartiles: 0.33, 0.51, and 0.63; 24/25 corre-
lations were positive), respectively, for the happiness, anger, and
trustworthiness CI’s in older adults. This suggests indeed a high
reliability across participants. We thus summed the individual CIs
within each condition and subject group (see Figure 2), obtain-
ing a total of six group CIs. We transformed these group CIs into
Z-scores planes by dividing them by the square root of the num-
ber of individuals in the appropriate subject group. In Figure 2,
the Z-scored group CIs are superimposed on a grayscale face to
help interpretation. The bright red (Z-score ≥ 4.30) and bright
blue blobs (Z-score ≤ −4.30), respectively, indicate regions where
bright pixels were significantly correlated positively with the judg-
ment and regions where dark pixels were significantly correlated
negatively with the judgment (Pixel test, two-tailed, search region
= 4275 pixels, p < 0.05).
Next, for each type of judgment, we subtracted the CI asso-
ciated with the group of young adults from the CI associated
with the group of older adults, and divided by square root of
FIGURE 2 | Colored images represent smooth group-judgment
classification images transformed into z-scores superimposed on a
grayscale face. Grayscale images represent raw group-judgment
classification images added to a grayscale facewith the same range of values.
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2 to transform into Z-scores. Pixel tests revealed no significant
difference between the two groups. This is not too surprising
because such a contrast is very conservative. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that some pixels of the mouth attained statistical significance
with a Z-score of 5 in a young CI and that it did not attain
statistical significance with a Z-score of 0 in the correspond-
ing old CI. The contrast CI would not attain significance [i.e.,
(5–0)/
√
2 = ∼3.54, which is clearly below the statistical threshold
of 4.30]. In fact, the young and old adults CIs were highly cor-
related: the proportion of shared variance (i.e., squared Pearson
correlation) between the happiness CIs, within an ellipse of 63×
95 pixels, or 3.35 × 5.05◦ of visual angle, centered on the faces,
is 0.46 [95% confidence interval = (0.426, 0.488); all confidence
intervals reported in this article were evaluated using a Bootstrap
method; for details, see DiCiccio and Efron, 1996], that between
the anger CIs is 0.36 [95% confidence interval = (0.327, 0.388)],
and that between the trust CIs is 0.28 [95% confidence inter-
val = (0.258, 0.306)]. These R2 values are all the more impressive
that simulations put the maximum proportion of shared vari-
ance between the true CIs and the CIs derived in our experiment
in the vicinity of 0.80 for old adults, and of 0.88 for younger
adults. In turn, this imposes an upper limit on the proportion of
shared variance between the measured smooth CIs in the young
and older adults of about 0.70. In other words, the proportion
of shared variance between the two trustworthiness CIs—0.28—
should be compared to this maximum value of 0.7 rather than 1.
These similarities camouflage important differences between
the two age groups. We measured the strength of relationship
between the trustworthiness, happiness and anger CIs within the
two subject groups. For the group of young adults, the trustwor-
thiness CI is more like the happiness CI than the anger CI. Indeed,
the shared variance between the trustworthiness and the happi-
ness CIs is 0.35 [95% confidence interval= (0.320, 0.385)], again,
within an ellipse of 63 × 95 pixels, whereas the shared variance
between the trustworthiness and the anger CIs is 0.21 [95% con-
fidence interval = (0.182, 0.235)]. However, these statistics are
somewhat misleading because the happiness and the anger CIs
shared an important proportion of their variances—0.37 [95%
confidence interval = (0.339, 0.401)]. The proportion of shared
variance between the trustworthiness and the happiness CIs, once
the shared variance between the happiness and the anger CIs
has been removed from the happiness CI [i.e., happiness CI -
(a ∗ anger CI + b), with a and b two scalars obtained by least-
square linear regression] is then 0.16 [95% confidence interval =
(0.141, 0.178)]; and the proportion of shared variance between
the trustworthiness and the anger CIs, once the shared vari-
ance between the happiness and the anger CIs has been removed
from the anger CI, is 0.014 [95% confidence interval = (0.0096,
0.0197)].
For the group of older adults, a slightly different pattern is
observed. The shared variance between the trustworthiness and
the happiness CIs is very similar to the shared variance between
the trustworthiness and the anger CIs. Indeed, the proportion of
shared variance between the trustworthiness and the happiness
CIs is 0.30 [95% confidence interval = (0.277, 0.336)], whereas
that shared variance between the trustworthiness CI and the anger
CI is also 0.30 [95% confidence interval= (0.272, 0.328)]. But the
happiness and the anger CIs shared as much as a proportion of
0.44 of their variances [95% confidence interval= (0.406, 0.473)].
The proportion of shared variance between the trustworthiness
and the happiness CIs, once the shared variance between the hap-
piness and the anger CIs has been removed from the happiness CI,
is 0.06 [95% confidence interval = (0.054, 0.076)]; and the pro-
portion of shared variance between the trustworthiness and the
anger CIs, once the shared variance between the happiness and
the anger CIs has been removed from the anger CI, is also 0.06
[95% confidence interval = (0.048, 0.069)].
DISCUSSION
The main purpose of this study was to investigate and com-
pare implicit representations of faces expressing trustworthiness,
happiness and anger in young and older adults using a reverse
correlation method. To our knowledge, our study is the first one
to use reverse correlation with older individuals in order to bet-
ter understand processes underlying social judgments in this age
group. Our study reveals that the internal representations of trust
(28% of shared variance), anger (36% of shared variance), and
happiness (46% of shared variance) are very similar for young
and older adults. However, a more subtle analysis revealed that the
relationship between the judgment of trust and the judgments of
happiness and anger was different in young and in older adults.
When we look at the results of the older group of participants,
we find a large shared variance between happiness and anger
CIs (42%), suggesting a continuum between the two representa-
tions, which is compatible with Todorov’s theory of the processes
underlying trust judgments. Moreover, we find a large and equally
shared variance (30%) between trust and anger, and trust and
happiness, which, considered together, suggest that trust is judged
on this continuum. This notion is reinforced by the findings
that explained variances in trust drops by 80%, symmetrically
(from 30 to 6%) once the shared variance (i.e., the continuum)
between the happiness and anger CIs has been removed. In sum,
in older adults, there seems to be an anger-happiness contin-
uum, and this continuum seems to explain a large portion of the
trust CI. Nonetheless, the shared variances between trust and the
happiness and anger residuals suggest that there is more to the
judgment of trust than simply the happiness-anger continuum.
In younger adults, the situation is somewhat different: again
there is a large shared variance between happiness and anger CIs
(37%), which suggests some sort of continuum between the two
representations. However, the somewhat asymmetric shared vari-
ance between trust and happiness (35%) and trust and anger
(21%), suggests that trust judgments made in the context of
money investment are not only explained by this happiness-anger
continuum, and that trust is more related to happiness than to
anger. This is strengthened by the fact that 16% of shared variance
remains (almost half) between trust and happiness once the hap-
piness and anger shared variance (i.e., the continuum) has been
removed from the happiness CI, whereas it’s only 1% for trust and
anger only. In other words, for young adults, there is something
specific about the representation of happiness that explains the
trust representation in addition to the happiness-anger contin-
uum, and very little, if anything, specific about anger that explains
the trust representation.
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The discrepancies between our results with young adults and
the Todorov group results in many experiments exploring trust
judgments in young adults should not be blown out of propor-
tion. These discrepancies might originate from several method-
ological differences. One of the important factors to consider is
that the stimuli we used were faces of women only. The con-
nection between masculinity and anger, for example, could be
stronger than the one between femininity and anger, which could
explain why our group of young adults relied less on the anger
judgment to make their trust judgment. This might explicate
why the eyebrows are almost absent in our anger CIs while they
have been shown to be preponderant in the anger CIs of Western
Caucasian participants (Jack et al., 2011). Other differences in
methodology could also explain differences in the results. Most
importantly, we asked participants to judge trustworthiness in a
specific context (i.e., “If you had a big amount of money to invest,
who would you trust the most with your money?”) in order to
eliminate context as a potential source of variability—especially
across age groups—from our results.
Of course, social judgments are complex and multidimen-
sional, and judgments of trust are no exception to this statement.
Todorov’s theory inserts trustworthiness judgments in an emo-
tional continuum, between anger and happiness. However, other
researchers have positioned this judgment on different contin-
uums. For instance, Fiske et al. (2007) have argued that social
judgments can be classified in two main dimensions: warmth and
competence. Judgments of warmth (i.e., perceived intent: friend-
liness, helpfulness, sincerity, morality, trustworthiness) would
occur first in order to determine whether the person has good
or bad intentions. Judgments of competence (i.e., perceived abil-
ity: intelligence, skill, creativity) would appear shortly after and
would help determine whether the person has the ability to act
these intentions. These two dimensions would be linked and posi-
tively correlated. Even though our goal was to diminish ambiguity
concerning the type of judgment asked, judging trust in a con-
text of financial investment could have led to associating trust
in a stronger way to a competence type of judgment than to a
warmth type of judgment. However, the dimensions of warmth
and competence, as described by Fiske et al. (2007), are positively
correlated, which suggests that trustworthiness judgments could
be embedded in both categories.
One problem in studying trustworthiness judgments is that
it is very difficult to establish a baseline allowing a “true” value
of trustworthiness. For example, when studying emotional judg-
ments, it is possible to take photographs of people feeling real
emotions, thereby allowing us to know that a given photograph of
someone expressing a feeling of joy really is a true and valid repre-
sentation of the emotion. In trust judgments, it seems impossible
to find photographs of people that we know for sure can be
trusted, and then to classify objectively how trustworthy these
people are, based on their life experiences. This difficulty thus
makes it hard to establish a measure of performance in trustwor-
thiness judgments and to rely on this measure in order to study
variability in the way different people judge how trustworthy faces
are. Since judgments of trustworthiness are of particular impor-
tance in our everyday interactions, it seems necessary to generate
new ways to explore this question more efficiently, particularly in
more vulnerable populations such as older adults.
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